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I. INTRODUCTION  
A new technology can expose the cracks in legal doctrine. Sometimes a tech-
nology resists analogy. Sometimes through analogies, it reveals inconsistencies in 
the law, flaws in framing, or friction in the fit between different parts of the legal 
system. This essay addresses robots in the home, and what they reveal about U.S. 
privacy law. Household robots might not themselves destroy U.S. privacy law, but 
they will reveal its inconsistencies, and may show where it is most likely to fracture. 
Just as drones are serving as a legislative “privacy catalyst”1—encouraging the en-
actment of new privacy laws as people realize they are not legally protected from 
privacy invasions—household robots may serve as a doctrinal privacy catalyst. 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor of Law at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, and Affiliated 
Fellow at the Information Society Project at Yale Law School. Thanks to Jack Balkin for co-teaching our 
Artificial Intelligence and Robots seminar, Ryan Calo for welcoming me into the law-and-robotics commu-
nity, and Bryan H. Corbellini for giving me a much-needed afternoon off. Thanks to Scott Peppett and Guy 
Rub for helpful comments. Mistakes are my own. 
 1. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29–33 (2011).  
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Household robots may spur doctrinal changes by virtue of a number of their tech-
nosocial characteristics. 
Some household robots are already here: the Roomba already vacuums our 
floors and scares our pets. In Japan, fuzzy robot seals are used in eldercare.2 Robots 
may come into the home first as toys. Mattel is touting its speaking doll, “Hello Bar-
bie,” and the robotic dinosaur toy, Pleo, uses speech recognition and adapts to its 
owner’s behavior.3 Household and caretaker robots are on the agenda for major tech-
nology companies. Bill Gates in 2007 called for a “robot in every home . . . .”4 And 
Toyota is currently experimenting with “care assist robots” that can lift and carry 
elderly patients, preventing injury to human caretakers and allowing people with de-
mentia to remain longer in their homes.5 Robot & Frank, an only slightly futuristic 
movie about an elderly man with a friendly caretaker robot, envisions a near future 
in which privacy, ethics, and relationships are challenged by a helpful household 
robot.6 
There are two basic legal puzzles raised—or revealed—by household robots. 
First, there is the question of whether a robot’s permission to be in a space also grants 
it permission to record information about that space. Second, there is the broader 
legal question of whether traditional legal protection of the home as a privileged, 
private space will withstand invasion by digital technology that has permission to be 
there. In other words, when we agree to allow robots in our homes, are we corre-
spondingly agreeing to allow them to record? To allow in the third parties with which 
robots communicate? This essay’s basic claim is that the legally salient aspects of 
home robots may drive a collision between the doctrinal understanding of privacy in 
real physical space, and privacy in the digital realm. That conflict in turn reveals 
inconsistent understandings of permission and consent in context, across privacy law. 
This essay begins by identifying the legally salient features of home robots: the 
aspects of home robots that will likely drive the most interesting legal questions. It 
then explores how current privacy law governing both law enforcement and private 
parties addresses a number of questions raised by home robots. First, how does pri-
vacy law treat entities that enter places (physically, or through sense-enhancing tech-
nologies) where they are not invited? Second, how does privacy law treat entities that 
are invited into a physical space, but were not invited to record in that space? How 
does privacy law treat consent, both express and implied? Fourth, how does privacy 
law address entities that lull—or deceive—people into revealing more than they in-
tend to? And finally, in the private actor context, will robotic recording be considered 
to be speech? 
                                                          
 2. Andrew Griffiths, How Paro the Robot Seal is Being Used to Help UK Dementia Patients, 
GUARDIAN (July 8, 2014, 9:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/08/paro-robot-seal-de-
mentia-patients-nhs-japan. 
 3. Barbie Doll Will Be Internet Connected to Chat to Kids, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31502898; For Pleo the Robot Dinosaur, a Second Act in an Ameri-
can Life, CNET (January 9, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/for-pleo-the-robot-dinosaur-a-sec-
ond-act-in-an-american-life/. 
 4. See Bill Gates, A Robot in Every Home, SCI. AM., January 2007, at 58, 65, available at 
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/A_Robot_in_Every_Home.pdf. 
 5. Wendy Hall, Technology Could Help People With Dementia Remain in Their Homes, 
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2014, 3:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2014/jun/23/tech-
nology-help-people-dementia-longitude-prize. 
 6. ROBOT & FRANK (Samuel Goldwyn Films 2012). 
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The rise of robots in the home is a form of technosocial change.7 Both the tech-
nology and the social norms around its use will develop. That technosocial change 
in turn will reveal strains in the law’s treatment of privacy harms, especially around 
questions of what constitutes sensitive information, and the role of consent or as-
sumption of risk. 
Evaluating how home robots might be treated under U.S. privacy law leads to 
at least one particularly interesting observation: that U.S. privacy law’s treatment of 
the government and treatment of private actors are not aligned with respect to the 
voluntary sharing of information by a data subject. In the Fourth Amendment con-
text, sharing information with a third party gives rise to an assumption of risk that 
law enforcement might access that information—and thus means law enforcement 
may access that information without a warrant. In the private actor context, however, 
sharing information with a third party gives rise to obligations on behalf of that third 
party to protect the information. 
This essay also contributes the observation that the legally interesting aspects 
of a new technology will vary depending on what kind of law is applied. What is 
interesting about a technology from the perspective of, say, tort law or tax law is not 
necessarily interesting from the perspective of privacy law. This observation re-
sponds to Ryan Calo’s recent discussion of why robots are or are not exceptional.8 A 
technology and it social uses may be exceptional in different areas of law for different 
reasons—and may simultaneously be completely unexceptional elsewhere. 
II. WHY HOUSEHOLD ROBOTS ARE LEGALLY INTERESTING  
Robots are embodied technologies that contain software, or code, and move 
and act on other objects in real space. While there is no single definition of a robot, 
some consensus has formed around defining robots as technologies that sense, think, 
and then act on and in the physical world.9 The Internet of Things and household 
robots raise privacy questions along the same spectrum, but certain features of ro-
bots—that they can move by themselves, may make their “own” decisions, and have 
social meaning—will raise fairly unique privacy questions. 
The technical definition of what a robot is differs from what might make a robot 
interesting from a legal perspective. This section thus addresses legally salient as-
pects of household robots: the aspects that are particularly of interest to privacy law. 
To identify the legally salient features of household robots, we must start with (1) 
the privacy harms at issue, and (2) why implied consent or assumption of risk is 
central to the legal discussion. 
A. Types of Privacy Harm 
To understand what aspects of household robots are legally salient, we have to 
articulate what privacy harms household robots might cause. Robots, as part of their 
basic functionality, sense and record their environment. They will often share that 
                                                          
 7. Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications 
of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614, 619 (2011) (using the term “technosocial” to refer to the “in-
tertwined effects of technological and social change”). 
 8. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2402972. 
 9. Id. at 117. 
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information with third parties, or store that information in the cloud. Household ro-
bots thus pose two basic privacy concerns: concerns over the excessive sharing and 
processing of information, and concerns over the initial recording of information. 
Information sharing can threaten contextual integrity: the reliance people place 
on the idea that information revealed in one context, governed by one set of social 
norms, will not be moved into or used in another.10 The sharing of information gath-
ered by household robots would take information revealed in the home, and share or 
use it in very different contexts.11 This type of privacy violation could cause chilling 
and conforming effects. When information revealed in the home is shared and used 
outside of the home, people may stop trusting that the home is a private location, and 
may stop sharing information and conform their behavior to majority norms even 
within the home.12 
A second, related type of privacy harm threatened by household robots occurs 
at the moment at which information is captured.13 The second type of privacy harm 
that household robots threaten is to interfere with individual’s ability to accurately 
dynamically manage social accessibility at a particular moment, by capturing infor-
mation people assume will not be captured. People often use physical features of 
their environment, such as walls, to manage their social accessibility. They also rely 
on features of social relationships—the idea that a trusted person will not disclose 
information to third parties—and on temporal features of relationships, such as for-
getfulness over time. Household robots threaten the ability of individuals to conduct 
this “boundary management” because in addition to crossing physical boundaries, or 
being able to “sense” through physical boundaries using sense-enhancement technol-
ogies, robots’ social features may elicit trust where trust is not deserved. Thus house-
hold robots pose at least two harms with respect to information capture: people may 
inaccurately manage their social accessibility, or knowing that they are watched, may 
again change their behavior at the moment of interaction. 
B. Consent or Assumption of Risk 
A recurring theme in U.S. privacy doctrine is that in certain contexts, by dis-
closing information people assume the risk that information will travel, and thus can-
not claim that their privacy has been violated.14 For example, two people embracing 
at a fair could not claim that their privacy had been violated when a photograph of 
the embrace ended up on the front page of a newspaper, because they assumed the 
risk the information would travel by embracing in a public space.15 And under the 
Fourth Amendment, you currently have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
                                                          
 10. See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy 
in Public, 17 L. & PHIL. 559, 567–68 (1998), available at http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/pa-
pers/privacy.pdf. 
 11. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 
(2004).  
 12. See generally Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amend-
ment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015). 
 13. Margot E. Kaminski, Theory of Privacy for Information-Gathering Laws, WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 14.  See generally Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (1953). 
 15. Id. 
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phone numbers you dial, in part because you share them with the telephone com-
pany.16 Perhaps the biggest doctrinal puzzle raised by household robots will be 
whether information revealed in a traditionally private location—the home—can be 
treated as not private because it has been shared with third parties as a part of a ro-
bot’s functioning. 
C. The Legally Salient Aspects of Household Robots 
As discussed, household robots may cause two types of privacy harms: viola-
tion of contextual integrity and boundary management challenges. Whether those 
privacy harms will be legally protectable may hinge on whether people are under-
stood to be assuming a risk of privacy violations by sharing information with third 
parties. This understanding gives us the background for identifying the legally salient 
aspects of household robots. 
Ryan Calo has suggested that robots in general will have three effects on pri-
vacy: they will increase the amount of direct surveillance, they will increase access 
to formerly private spaces, and they will have social meaning.17 Calo has also sug-
gested more generally that the “essential qualities” of robots—which I understand to 
be the legally salient qualities of robots—are (1) embodiment, (2) emergence, and 
(3) social valence.18 This essay takes a narrower approach, asking what aspects of 
household robots in particular are legally salient, from the perspective of privacy law. 
Interestingly, taking this narrower approach reveals slightly different salient features. 
This suggests that what is legally salient about a new technology will depend on 
which laws are applied. 
The ability of robots to sense and record information, and likelihood that 
they will share that information with third parties for storage and processing pur-
poses, are clearly legally salient features from a privacy perspective. On the one 
hand, the fact that robots must take in information to properly navigate an environ-
ment (just as a phone call must be made on telephone lines) suggests that the sensing 
might be treated as necessary for functionality and deserving of legal privacy protec-
tion. On the other hand, the known ability of robots to record massive amounts of 
information about private places raises the question of whether household robot own-
ers have consented to that recording, implicitly or explicitly, by having a robot in the 
home. 
The sensory aspect of robots also raises interesting legal questions about how 
to treat a robot (1) that records more information than is necessary for functionality; 
(2) that records more information than it has told its owner it is recording (fails to 
provide notice); (3) that has been given permission to enter or operate in certain lo-
cations, but not to record in those locations; and (4) that senses or records information 
humans aren’t used to monitoring with their own senses (like temperature). The cen-
trality of sensing and recording to household robots’ functionality is a legally salient 
aspect of household robotics, especially when that sensing involves non-visual 
senses such as thermal imaging.  
                                                          
 16. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 17. M. Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 187–88 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A. Bekey eds., 2012). 
 18. Calo, supra note 9 (manuscript at 120–36). 
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The ability of household robots to move and otherwise interfere with their 
physical environments is a second legally salient feature. If a robot can open doors, 
or go into rooms of a house where it has not been invited, it is capable of violating 
contextual integrity or threatening boundary management. But if a person fully un-
derstands that their household robot is capable of going wherever it wants, then the 
known ability of robots to move from room to room or through doors may suggest 
that the robot’s owner has assumed the risk that the home is no longer private. Thus 
movement is one legally salient feature of household robots: depending on how 
courts characterize it, movement could push the legal doctrine in a number of direc-
tions. 
The social valence or social meaning of home robots—that is, the fact that 
robots may be anthropomorphic or appear as quasi-human actors—will be salient to 
privacy law. There is evidence that people treat anthropomorphic robots with in-
creased compassion and trust.19 A robot that lulls people into revealing more than 
they intend to may be viewed as deceptive technology; or it may be treated similarly 
to false human friends. 
Finally, the ability of robots to process information, or “think” and “make 
decisions,” is legally salient. Emergent behavior could affect the scope of implied 
consent or assumption of risk if household robots make decisions outside the scope 
of what their owners believe they have agreed to. It may also affect discussions of 
what kind of liability regime should be in place for robot creators, influencing dis-
cussion of whether there should be a strict liability regime or negligence standard, or 
something else. Finally, emergent behavior will affect legal conversations about the 
applicability of the emerging First Amendment right to record, and whether robots—
or their programmers—should be legally considered to be “authors” of the recorded 
information they gather.20 
In summary, the legally salient aspects of household robots include: (1) their 
need to sense and ability to record vast amounts of information that they often will 
share with third parties; (2) their ability to independently move in a physical envi-
ronment; (3) what Calo calls their “social valence” or anthropomorphic characteris-
tics; and (4) their ability to process information, or “think,” in complex, unpredicta-
ble ways. Of Calo’s named qualities of robots, embodiment is less important to pri-
vacy law, except as it affects the ability to move through physical space or creates a 
social presence through anthropomorphic characteristics. 
III. WHAT HOUSEHOLD ROBOTS REVEAL ABOUT PRIVACY LAW 
This section turns from household robots themselves to what they reveal about 
U.S. law. New technologies are often incorporated into case law by analogy.21 But 
trying to fit household robots into existing boxes under current case law reveals prob-
lems and inconsistencies in privacy doctrine. This section begins by discussing 
                                                          
 19. Calo, supra note 9 (manuscript at 132, 135). 
 20. Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014); see also Annemarie 
Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 5 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 22 
(2012) (for discussion of AI authorship in copyright law). 
 21. Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots? 19 (2013) 
(prelimary draft), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263363. 
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household robots and the Fourth Amendment, and then turns to law governing pri-
vate actors rather than the government. 
A. Government and the Fourth Amendment 
The home is privileged in Fourth Amendment analysis; it receives “paramount” 
privacy protection.22 The “very core" of the Fourth Amendment is “the right of a man 
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental in-
trusion."23 In some ways, U.S. privacy jurisprudence treats “information revealed in 
the home” as its own category of sensitive information.24 
But the third party doctrine in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence explains that 
when people voluntarily share information with third parties, they do not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in that information.25 Other cases suggest that a per-
son has no reasonable expectation of privacy from a privacy-invading technology 
that is in general or regular public use.26 Will the centrality of the home in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence withstand the incursion of household robots? The answer 
to this question depends in large part on the power of analogies, and on how far courts 
are willing to extend current understandings about assumptions of risk or implied 
consent to information gathered in the home. 
This Section outlines relevant Fourth Amendment case law on the following 
questions: first, how might home robots be treated when they enter or observe phys-
ical spaces to which they have not been invited? Second, how might home robots be 
treated when they record information in a location where they have been invited to 
be—but in which they were not invited to record? Third, how might the presence of 
home robots be understood to imply consent to the reuse of information? Fourth, how 
might actual contractual agreements and/or privacy policies around home robots be 
treated, under the Fourth Amendment? And fifth, how might Fourth Amendment 
doctrine treat falsely reassuring or outright deceptive robots? 
1. Entering where not invited 
Household robots might enter a physical space in a home to which they have 
not been invited, or use sense-enhancing technology to “see” into that space. The 
legally salient features of household robots with respect to this question are their 
ability to move, to sense using sense-enhancing technology, and possibly the ability 
to make emergent decisions that cause them to act “independently,” or contrary to 
owners’ preferences. 
                                                          
 22. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
 23. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 24. Sensitive information receives more privacy protection. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). For a discussion of how the home is treated as sensitive in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of 
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 32). 
 25. E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
 26. See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring) (asking whether “the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used 
by the public . . . .”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence once was “tied to common-law trespass,” 
although it did not require technical trespass, only “actual intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area.”27 The Supreme Court famously decoupled Fourth Amend-
ment violations from trespass in Katz v. United States, explaining that the Constitu-
tion “protects people, not places.”28 A person’s privacy could be protected in an area 
outside the home and accessible to the public if the person had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.29 But the Supreme Court also observed in Katz that “[w]hat a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.”30 
The question thus is as follows: when a person lets a robot into her house, and 
assumes it will remain in one area of the house, is it a violation of that person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy for the robot to enter, or use sense-enhancing tech-
nology to virtually enter, a room or space where it is not supposed to be? To bring 
this discussion into the scope of the Fourth Amendment, this question presumes that 
the robot is either controlled or accessed by law enforcement. 
The Supreme Court addressed a related question when it evaluated police use 
of sense-enhancing technology in Kyllo v. United States.31 There, the Court con-
cluded that police could not use thermal imaging to “see” into the interior of the home 
without a warrant.32 The majority analogized thermal imaging to trespass, rather than 
to gathering information such as smells, which could be picked up remotely by hu-
mans without technological aids.33 The Court explained that “obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the home’s interior that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question 
is not in general public use.”34 
The question, then, may be whether police access to information obtained by a 
robot in searches unauthorized by a homeowner constitutes use of “technology . . . 
in general public use.”35 Many people may end up with household robots, which may 
make the robots themselves technology in general public use. But it seems unlikely 
that people will generally access information from each other’s robots, suggesting 
that government coopting of household robots’ ability to move from room to room 
or see through walls would not involve technology in general public use. 
However, three cases on aircraft photography may cut the other way. In Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court found that no warrant is 
required for law enforcement to employ naked-eye observation or aerial photography 
from a fixed-wing aircraft, or from a helicopter.36 In a third case, Dow Chemical v. 
United States, the Court found that enhanced aerial photography did not require a 
                                                          
 27. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31; Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510–12. 
 28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 29. See id.  
 30. Id. at 351. 
 31. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. 
 32. Id. at 40.  
 33. Id. at 48. 
 34. Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
 35. Id.  
 36. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 
(1989). 
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warrant.37 The Court reasoned that planes and helicopters are common technologies, 
and thus people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against observations 
made from them. If robots become truly ubiquitous, like planes, then these cases 
suggest the Fourth Amendment might not offer protection—even if robots have not 
been granted express permission to be in a particular room or space. 
In recent cases, however, the Court has employed preservationist reasoning to 
protect a level of privacy available before the development of new technologies.38 In 
both a recent case on searching cellular telephones, and in Kyllo, the Court referred 
to the necessity of preserving the degree of privacy protection in existence at the time 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.39 If this is truly a guiding principle for the 
Court, then information gathered by nosy, trespassing robots from the home should 
remain protected by the Fourth Amendment, regardless of how common robots be-
come. 
2. Recording where they are invited to be, but not to record 
A second Fourth Amendment question is how to treat robots that are invited 
into private spaces, but not invited to record or observe using another sense. In other 
words, people may expect household robots to move around in a space, and to per-
form an expected function, but not to record interactions or share them with other 
parties. 
A recent Supreme Court case can be understood as applicable to this scenario. 
The Court recently considered whether a drug-sniffing dog brought by police officers 
onto a porch violated the Fourth Amendment.40 The Court reasoned that while a po-
lice officer may rely on an “implicit license” to walk on the porch to knock at the 
front door like other visitors, that “implicit license” did not extend to using a trained 
drug-sniffing dog.41 
This case suggests that if a household robot has been invited to a private space 
(ie has a license to be there), but a person can exhibit a real expectation that the robot 
would not be recording information or using sense-enhancing technology without 
notice, that person might have a reasonable expectation of privacy against the unper-
mitted recording. 
3. Implied Assumption of Risk (or Implied Consent) 
Both of the previous two scenarios involved a robot breaching its owner’s or-
ders. In the above two scenarios, a household robot exceeds explicit permissions or 
ignores an explicit ban by (a) entering (physically or sensually) into spaces unwel-
comed, or (b) recording unwelcomed in a space where it might be permitted to phys-
                                                          
 37. Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
 38. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27–28; Riley, 488 U.S. at 445; see also Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 426, 489–99 (2011). 
 39. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28 (“This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”); Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95 
(2014). 
 40. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013). 
 41. Id. at 1415. 
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ically be. But what about when a robot’s owner cannot claim to have denied permis-
sion to the robot, either to access specific areas or to record that environment? This 
is where the doctrinal muddle in Fourth Amendment law revealed by household ro-
bots—the tension between third party doctrine and protection for the home—gets 
most interesting. 
Most robots will share information with third parties for processing purposes 
or just to store information in the cloud. The Supreme Court has in a line of cases 
explained that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information, 
such as the records of phone numbers dialed, revealed to or stored with third parties.42 
If a person fails to restrict their household robot’s access to particular parts of the 
house, or cannot indicate that she thought the robot wasn’t recording, then infor-
mation gathered by the robot and sent to the cloud or revealed to the robot’s seller 
would likely fall within third party doctrine. Then police may access that information 
through the third party without a warrant. To be clear: there are complex statutory 
schemes in place for handling police access to stored communications and telephone 
numbers dialed.43 But these statutes apply to communications, and thus likely do not 
apply to most information robots will store.  
Justice Sotomayor recently suggested that the third party doctrine has no place 
in our digital world, since most information is now stored with or communicated 
through third parties.44 In a recent decision on cell phone searches, Chief Justice Rob-
erts suggested (but did not hold) that people could have an expectation of privacy in 
phone numbers when that information is combined with more sensitive information 
such as labeling a particular number with a name, or “home.”45 These indicators sug-
gest that members of the Court are getting ready to reconsider third party doctrine, 
or at least to considerably narrow its scope. Similarly, a recent D.C. Circuit decision 
evaluating the constitutionality of the government’s bulk storage of telephone 
metadata explained that big data is different in kind from the information at issue 
when the Supreme Court first created the third party doctrine.46 
Household robots may place the third party doctrine in an even rockier position. 
Part of the reasoning that gives rise to the third party doctrine is that the information 
at issue is not inherently sensitive—in the case of phone numbers, it is considered to 
be “envelope” rather than “content” information.47 When household robots record 
information in the home, courts may find that information about the home is inher-
ently more sensitive than “envelope” information like phone numbers, and thus re-
fuse to apply the third party doctrine. We can see this happening in at least two 
places: first, the Sixth Circuit has held that there is a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the content of one’s email, even though people technically share their email 
                                                          
 42. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979). 
 43. E.g. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2014); Stored Com-
munications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2014); Pen Registers and Traps, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2014). 
 44. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 45. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). 
 46. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C. 2013); but see In re FBI, 2013 WL 5741573 
(FISA Ct. 2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2105, 2113–2117 (2009). But see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (treating 
bank records as “less sensitive” information because the records perform an act [transaction], not because 
they are envelope information). 
2015] SYMPOSIUM EDITION 671 
 
with third parties such as Google.48 Second, the Eleventh Circuit has pointed out that 
location information in the home is sensitive information49—even though location 
information outside of the home was held in older Supreme Court cases not to be 
inherently sensitive information.50 So there is developing precedent for the idea that 
being in or from the home makes information sensitive in nature.51 
4. Actual (Contractual) Agreements/ Privacy Policies 
One of the more interesting questions that might arise around the sharing of 
information with third parties by household robots is the impact of an actual agree-
ment—for example, a privacy policy—on a person’s “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.” If a person has a robot in their home, and has agreed to a particularly permis-
sive privacy policy, can they still have a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
the revelation of that information to the government? 
The Sixth Circuit addressed this question in its email case.52 The court reasoned 
that while some subscriber agreements might be “sweeping enough to defeat a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy … we doubt that will be the case in most situations.”53 
Importantly, the Sixth Circuit held that the ability of the third party to access sensitive 
information—in that case, the contents of emails—does not abolish an expectation 
of privacy against law enforcement in that information.54 
5. Lulling people into revealing information 
There is no Fourth Amendment doctrine that is clearly analogous to lulling 
people into revealing information through the social/anthropomorphic features of ro-
bots. But what case law there is suggests that the Fourth Amendment would not pro-
tect us from what we reveal to deceptive or reassuring robots. One could analogize 
the idea of the deceptive robot to a “false friend”: police do not need a warrant to get 
information from a confidential informant, or friend who decides to turn on a per-
son.55 More broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has upheld deceptive behavior by 
police, including consent to enter a residence when police commit fraud, or falsely 
claim to be there for a legitimate purpose.56 But if robots are instead analogized to 
                                                          
 48. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 49. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that in light of Jones, 
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for cell site location information and the Stored Communications 
Act protections were inadequate). See also In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983). 
 51. But see In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 609 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 52. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 266. 
 53. Id. at 286. 
 54.  “[T]he mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a communication 
cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. 
 55. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation 
where petitioner “was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrongdoing”); 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966). The Supreme Court has held that police also do not need 
a warrant to bug a confidential informant with the informant’s permission. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 749 (1971). 
 56. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“A government agent, in the same manner 
as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very 
672 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
diaries, rather than independent actors, then barring third party doctrine and storage 
of the information elsewhere, there may be a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
what gets revealed to a reassuring robot-friend.57 Which analogy courts choose—the 
false friend, or the diary—may be central to how deceptive robots are treated in the 
law enforcement context.58 
B. Private Parties 
The government will not be the only party interested in information gathered 
by household robots. And as evidenced by the above discussion of the third party 
doctrine, private parties may actually have more direct access to information gath-
ered by household robots than law enforcement will. It will be valuable for behav-
ioral advertising, for modifying or monitoring robot behavior, and for innovating to 
fill unmet needs. 
This Section evaluates several questions involving privacy violations by private 
parties. Most of these overlap with the questions addressed above in the context of 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. And interestingly, the answers in the case of private 
parties may differ. Thus contemplating household robots reveals interesting incon-
sistencies in U.S. privacy law, where some doctrinal areas may be evolving out of 
pace with others.  
This Section first addresses how the law might treat privacy violations by pri-
vate actors through robots that enter where they are not invited. Then it addresses 
robots that exceed the scope of their permitted entry into a private space by recording 
information revealed in that private space. It addresses implied assumptions of pri-
vacy risks; and actual contractual agreements. Finally, this Section discusses how to 
address robots that lull people into revealing more information to third parties than 
they intended, and, briefly, the question of whether household robots’ recording of 
information about their environments could constitute “speech” by private parties. 
1. Entering where not invited 
Just as with Fourth Amendment doctrine, in privacy law addressing private ac-
tors, trespass and privacy violations can be linked. The privacy tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion does not technically hinge on location, but does in practice suggest that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in privileged solitary places such as the 
                                                          
purposes contemplated by the occupant.”). See also United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432, 435 
(9th Cir. 1993) (“we have held that a law enforcement officer's use of a ruse to gain admittance does not 
implicate section 3109 because it entails no breaking”); Dickey v. United States, 332 F.2d 773, 777–78 (9th 
Cir. 1964); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 1959). See also Elizabeth E. Joh, Bait, Mask, 
and Ruse: Technology and Police Deception, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 246 (Apr. 2015). 
However, police may not lie about the existence of a search warrant, or lie about their true purpose 
once they identify themselves as government. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United 
States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (“It is a 
well established rule that a consent search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the consent was 
induced by the deceit, trickery or misrepresentation of the Internal Revenue agent.”). But see United States v. 
Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1305 (1984) (finding that cryptic statements about the nature of the investigation do 
not necessarily invalidate consent to search).  
 57. See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2479 (2014) (referring to a diary as a “highly personal 
item”). 
 58. Richards & Smart, supra note 21.  
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home.59 If a robot enters a room where it is not invited, acting as an agent of a private 
party, then it may commit the intrusion tort. Here, a household robot’s emergent be-
havior may create interesting problems around finding liability for those private ac-
tors who produced or allegedly control the robot. 
California has legislated against the use of new technologies to gain access to 
areas where information could not previously have been gathered without trespass-
ing.60 This approach reflects Justice Scalia’s language in Kyllo, the thermal imaging 
case, where Justice Scalia noted that virtual entrance into the home by technology 
not in public use was a Fourth Amendment violation.61 If a robot is given permission 
to enter part of the home, and exceeds the scope of that permission by entering a 
forbidden location either physically or technologically, it might be in violation of this 
law in California. 
2. Recording where they are invited to be, but not to record 
A more interesting question in the case of private actors is whether robots that 
are invited to be in a location, but not invited to record there, commit a privacy vio-
lation. The alternative is that their activity—unlike law enforcement activity—might 
be protected by the First Amendment. I discuss this prospect more below, in B(6). 
Existing case law points in both directions. On the one hand, some courts have 
found that granting permission to someone to be in a location constitutes granting 
permission to record, or at least obviates an expectation of privacy.62 Other courts, 
however, have distinguished between inviting somebody in or confiding in them, and 
allowing them to record that interaction.63 
 In one case, a court held that even though a victim of a car crash understood 
that a nurse would witness and remember conversations, the crash victim’s privacy 
was violated when those conversations were recorded.64 In another, reporters who 
entered a quack “doctor’s” home office by pretending to be patients were found by 
the Ninth Circuit to have violated the quack’s privacy, even though they were not 
technically trespassing.65 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit found that news re-
porters who recorded fraudulent behavior at an eye doctor’s office by posing as pa-
tients did not violate an expectation of privacy.66  
The illicitly recording robot may face divided case law. The deciding factor 
may be a distinction noted by the Seventh Circuit: unpermitted recording in the home 
poses a greater privacy risk that unpermitted recording in public.67 
                                                          
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(b) (1977). 
 60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (Supp. 2015). 
 61. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 62. See, e.g., Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1353–54 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 63. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 64. Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 497 (Cal. 1998). 
 65. Dietemann., 449 F.2d at 246, 249. See also Food Lion v. ABC Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing First Amendment limits and duty of loyalty, more than privacy.). 
 66. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1654–55.  
 67. Id. at 1352. 
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3. Implied Assumption of Risk (or Implied Consent) 
As in Fourth Amendment cases, courts in cases about private actors often find 
no expectation of privacy where people assume a considerable risk that their actions 
will not be private. For example, as discussed earlier, the couple embracing at a fair 
were found not to have an expectation of privacy because they had assumed a risk of 
discovery by appearing together in a crowded, public space.68 However, a woman 
photographed with her skirt up at a funhouse ride was not found to have assumed the 
risk of this photograph occurring, even though it took place in public, likely because 
her exposed body fell into the category of sensitive information.69 
Assessment of whether owning a household robot implies consent to having 
information recorded may once again hinge on whether courts treat information re-
vealed in the home as sensitive, or break it into subcategories where some infor-
mation is not sensitive and some (for example, sexual or bodily information) is.70 
4. Actual (Contractual) Agreements/Privacy Policies 
The most interesting area of privacy law governing private actors with respect 
to household robots—and the area revealed to be most different from Fourth Amend-
ment case law—involves actual contracts or privacy policies. Remember that in the 
Fourth Amendment context courts have applied the third party doctrine to find that 
people usually do not have an expectation of privacy in information revealed to third 
parties, reasoning that in revealing information to third parties a person consents to 
its not being private any more.71 But in the private actor context, courts sometimes 
find expectations of privacy even when a person has technically consented to sharing 
that information with others.72 
Christine Jolls has noted that in some contexts, courts outright ignore written 
agreements in cases evaluating privacy violations. Courts look beyond consent, even 
when it is given by written agreement, to substantive privacy norms.73 Similarly, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses its Section 5 authority to enforce against pri-
vate companies not only when they fail to uphold their own privacy policies, but also 
when a privacy policy is found to be inadequate, or “unfair.”74 
In other words, in the Fourth Amendment context, courts use actual or implied 
consent to explain away a privacy interest, where in the private actor context, they 
may consider substantive privacy norms to find a privacy violation even where con-
sent has technically been granted. In fact, the FTC’s privacy enforcement takes place 
                                                          
 68. Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P. 2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1953).  
 69. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964). 
 70. See, e.g., Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Val-
ues, 56 (May 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_re-
port_may_1_2014.pdf (suggesting the development of a taxonomy of kinds of information that can be col-
lected without consent, with consent, or never). 
 71. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 72. Christine Jolls, Rationality and Consent in Privacy Law 55 (Yale Law School, Working Paper 
Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Alumni_Affairs/Jolls_Rational-
ityandConsentinPrivacyLaw_1-21-10.pdf. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
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when there is a relationship between a consumer and a company; while to the Fourth 
Amendment, the existence of that relationship means there is a lower privacy interest, 
if any exists at all. 
A company drafting privacy policies for household robots may thus wish to 
strongly consider whether the policy adequately encompasses both industry stand-
ards and general privacy norms. As a practical matter, robots may be particularly ill-
equipped to fit with the current U.S. notice-and-choice privacy regime, when they 
lack capabilities for consumers to input privacy choices or are designed to calm con-
sumers into accepting their activity. 75 
5. Lulling People into Revealing Information 
The reassuring or lying robot may receive harsh treatment when the deception 
is driven by private actors. The treatment of deceptive private actors varies even more 
noticeably from the Fourth Amendment’s permissive treatment of “false friends” and 
lying law enforcement officers. Remember, when reporters lied and said they were 
patients to gain access to a quack “doctor’s” home office, they were found to violate 
his privacy.76 
The FTC also enforces against deceptive actors, who lie to get private infor-
mation.77 The FTC also, fascinatingly, enforces against actors that use technological 
design to elicit information, or to falsely indicate that something is private when it is 
not.78 This line of FTC enforcement against deceptive or unfair technological design 
appears directly applicable to the anthropomorphic design characteristics of robots. 
If a robot appears trustworthy where it is not, it may be deemed deceptive by the 
FTC.79 
6. Is Recording Speech (and whose)? 
A final but very important issue with respect to the use of robots by private 
actors involves a line of developing First Amendment doctrine. A number of appel-
late courts have recognized some version of a First Amendment “right to record,” 
                                                          
 75. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 Maryland L. Rev. 785, 794 (forthcoming 
2015)(Mar. 23, 2015 8:03 AM), http://www.werobot2015.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Hartzog-Unfair-
Deceptive-Robots.pdf (“social robots are designed to draw us in”). See also Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the 
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 76. Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 245 (9th Cir. 1971); but see Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 
F.3d 1345, 1345 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 77. E.g., Press Release, FTC, Website Operator Banned from the ‘Revenge Porn’ Business After 
FTC Charges He Unfairly Posted Nude Photos (Jan. 29, 2015) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-
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 79. Hartzog, supra note 75, at 20 (asking in the context of evaluating FTC enforcement against 
robots whether it matters that robots are “specifically designed to extract personal information through social 
engineering”). 
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often in the context of citizens using their cellular telephones to record police offic-
ers.80 A private company in Utah has used this “right to record” to challenge Utah’s 
law governing information-gathering by automated license plate readers.81 Utah 
amended the law so that it now applies only to law enforcement, and not private 
actors.82 
There is a real question of whether household robots—or really, the private 
parties that built them or correspond with them—have a First Amendment “right to 
record” in private spaces. Most interactions will be governed by voluntary privacy 
policies that can be enforced by the FTC. But in instances where states wish to create 
new privacy laws, they may have to keep the First Amendment in mind. Once again, 
however, the fact that this information is being revealed and recorded in the home 
may outweigh any interest in “newsworthy” information that might be revealed, un-
der First Amendment newsgathering doctrine. In light of Supreme Court case law 
rejecting distinctions between high value and low value speech, however, this argu-
ment might face obstacles in courts. 
There is a legitimate question of whether robots or the private parties that pro-
grammed them constitute “speakers” at all.83 Here, again, emergent behavior makes 
for an interesting conversation. How directly involved in recording decisions do pri-
vate actors have to be, to garner First Amendment protection? If a private actor de-
cides to “record all,” will that gain more or less protection than somebody who rec-
ords only short selections of information, or somebody who gives a robot the ability 
to make its own decisions about what to record? 
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF WHAT HOME ROBOTS REVEAL  
In conclusion, household robots reveal a number of interesting tensions in U.S. 
privacy law. While the tensions exist now, even before the widespread introduction 
of the new technology, the use of robots in the privileged private space of the house-
hold may bring these tensions to a head. Household robots, in other words, may be a 
doctrinal privacy catalyst. 
Doctrinally, household robots will require courts to further consider the rela-
tionship between privacy, permission, and trespass. Courts will have to decide 
whether granting permission to an entity to be in a place also grants them permission 
to record information about that space. Courts will have to reconsider whether infor-
mation can be private against a larger audience, even if one agrees to share it with a 
much smaller audience. Courts will also, in the Fourth Amendment context, have to 
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reconcile treatment of the home as deserving of the utmost privacy protection with 
the third party doctrine. 
Considering household robots reveals two interesting substantive splits be-
tween the Fourth Amendment approach to privacy, and the approach we use to ad-
dress private actors. First, the Fourth Amendment tends to take a broad view of con-
sent as obviating a privacy interest, while law governing private actors can be more 
skeptical; it sometimes looks to substantive privacy norms, or even protects privacy 
interests precisely because information has been shared with third parties.84 Second, 
Fourth Amendment doctrine is more permissive of lying to get information, while 
law governing private actors enforces against deception—including deception by 
technological design. 
But perhaps what household robots most reveal is the continued need in the 
United States for a holistic approach to big data. Currently, U.S. privacy law is a 
patchwork of sectoral federal laws, in contrast with the EU’s holistic approach to 
data privacy.85 To address both privacy and fairness problems raised by data gather-
ing and analysis, we may wish to use household robots as an inspiration for enacting 
data privacy laws, based on Fair Information Practices. Such governance could in-
clude rules on collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limita-
tion, security safeguards, openness, accountability, and individual participation.86 
The United States currently relies on standards set by private parties and en-
forceable by the FTC. But perhaps the advent of household robots will finally bring 
truly home the notion that data processing carries with it real privacy and unfairness 
risks. Otherwise, Bill Gates’s hope of a robot in every home may go unrealized, and 
many robots may—after a few prominent privacy violations— be left at the front 
door. 
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